Lt Col Alfred James Foster Context Within six weeks of the British mobilisation, the German Army had fought their way to within thirty miles of Paris before being checked at the Battle of…
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Lt Col Alfred James Foster Context Within six weeks of the British mobilisation, the German Army had fought their way to within thirty miles of Paris before being checked at the Battle of…
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24th Oct 1917
On the night of 24th the 149th Bde relieved units of the 34th Division south of the Houthulst Forest and astride the Ypres to Staden Railway line. The 4th Bn moved into trenches in the right sub sector and the 7th Bn the left sub sector.
25th Oct 1917
At 8.31am Operation Orders for an attack were received from Brigade HQ.
4th Battalion War Diary
APPENDIX X A
OPERATION ORDER NO. 1A.
1. The 149th Infantry Bde will attack on the morning of the 26th inst, 4th NF on the right, 5th NF in centre and 7th NF on left, - 57th Div are attacking on our right, with 4th/5th Loyal North Lancs as their left battalion.
2. The battalion will attack on a 3 company frontage each company being on a platoon frontage.
‘A’ company on right, ‘B’ company in centre and ‘D’ company on left. ‘C’ Company will be in reserve on a 2 platoon frontage.
3. (a) Platoons will leap frog and capture and consolidate the objectives already given them i.e. FIRST WAVE to HUTS, SECOND WAVE to line V.126.96.36.199 – V.2.c.5.1. THIRD WAVE to final objective V.2.a.3.0 to V.2.d.15.55.
(b) Reserve company will move forward with attacking waves to a point approximately 200 yards west of the HUTS.
(c) ‘A’ company will detail parties to obtain touch with battalion on their right at the following points.
(a) Concrete shelter at V.8.a.1.8.
(b) Ditto at V.2.c.4.1.
(c) ROAD BRIDGE at V.2.d.0.6.
4. Two machine guns will accompany 4th wave of ‘B’ Company.
5. Two Stokes Mortars1 will be attached to ‘C’ company and will be available to fire at any strong points holding up the attack.
6. Barrage will begin to creep forward at ZERO + 8 minutes and will creep at the uniform rate of 100 yards in 8 minutes throughout. Lifts will be at 50 yards at a time.
7. Taping out of the assembly trench will be carried out under an officer from Battalion HQ. One line of tape will be laid from the Railway Embankment at point V.1.d.0.2. to V.7.b.6.5. Two guides will be left at the end of the tape on Railway Embankment. A short length of tape will be laid at right angles to assembly tape to mark the left of ‘D’ company, short lengths of tape will be laid at right angles to assembly tape every 130 yards to mark company frontages. The assembly tape marks position of leading wave.
8. ‘A’,’C’ and ‘D’ companies will move forward to assembly positions at 7pm tonight each company providing its own covering party. ‘B’ company will withdraw to the assembly tape at 11pm. Completion of assembly will be notified by code word ARRAS, sent by runner to battalion HQ.
9. 1 contact aeroplane will be flying over companies front at zero + 1 hour 30 mins and at zero + 3 hours heading troops will show their position to contact aeroplane only when called for
(a) by Claxon horn
(b) by series of white Very lights dropped from the plane.
10. RAP will be at PASCHAL FARM 2.
11. PRISONERS 1 man as escort to 5 Bosches
12. Reports will be forwarded to battalion HQ at TAUBE FARM 3 as frequently as possible and at least once in the first hour after zero.
13. Battalion HQ will open at TAUBE FARM at 7pm tonight.
14. Zero will be at the fall of the barrage. Time of this will be notified later, also synchronisation of watches.
15. General compass bearing of attack 55 degrees magnetic.
Issued at 1.30 pm
Copies to CO ‘A’, ‘B’, ‘C’ and ‘D’.
4th Battalion War Diary
CORRIGENDA TO OPERATION ORDER NO 1A
1. Owing to the swampy state of the ground on the right of our attack, it has been decided to attack on a 2 Coy frontage instead of a 3 Coy frontage. ‘B’,’C’ and ‘D’ companies will have dispositions exactly as laid down in O.O. no 1A.
2. ‘A’ company will NOT go to the assembly tape but will move from TRANQUILLE HOUSE 4 to TAUBE FARM at 9pm tonight, when they will be in battalion reserve.
3. Hot tea and rum will be brought up tonight 1 guide per company to be at TAUBE FARM at 11pm to guide carrying parties.
Issued at 2pm
Copies to CO, ‘A’,’B’,’C’ and ‘D’
The CO reported the change to Bde HQ:
25th Oct 1917
Communication between Bn HQ and the front line was extremely difficult as the route was under direct observation and subject to incessant shelling by the Germans. This was especially so on the line running parallel with the road north-west and south east of Tranquille House, because it appeared to be an enemy barrage line. There was no cover except for shell holes, so it had not been possible to lay a telephone wire, or for a visual signalling system to be established.
Two runners did manage to reach the front line coy and all operation orders were delivered safely. However, it was a close call, because they had mistakenly overshot the front line by at least fifty yards and had been stopped before they stumbled on the enemy.
Front line company were constantly shelled by our own Howitzers, and some casualties resulted.
Between 7 and 9pm coys moved forward to their assembly positions.
The attack formation was altered twice in 12 hours. The original intention was, to attack on a 3 coy frontage, each coy being on a platoon frontage in depth, in 4 waves (1 platoon in each wave). After the relief it was realised that with the swampy ground on the Bn right flank, there would only be room for a two coy frontage. The CO reported this to Bde HQ (Appendix B).
4th Battalion War Diary
L.T.3. CO’s report. “From reports received from the 11th SUFFOLKS," the right of my Battalion front is a swamp. Even if it is possible to assemble the right company, I do not consider they would be able to advance, but would have to be dug out. I propose with your permission to attack with two companies.only in the front line, one in support, and to keep the fourth company in reserve in TRANQUILLE HOUSE area. Conditions on rest of the front are such that if a man steps off a firm piece of ground into the slightest hollow he has to be dug out. There are very few firm pieces of ground away from the Railway and Roads.
Map 1 - 149th Brigade positions
25 Oct 1917
Summary of events
When 2nd Lt J.A. Burton actually laid the tape, he realised that there was only sufficient room for an attack frontage of one coy. Therefore, the front line platoon frontage was cut accordingly to one coy, the second coy was positioned to the rear of the right hand coy of the 5th Bn with instructions to wedge between the 4th and 5th Bn Coys at the front once the attack started. The third coy was held in reserve about one hundred yards to the rear of the front line coy (on a two platoon frontage) and the fourth coy under the Bn Cdr was positioned at Taube Farm and Tranquille House.
The Coys assembled in shell holes and dug-in, in the formation described above. A piece of tape was laid to mark the boundary between the 4th and 5th Bn. Hot food was packed in hay and carried up to the coys at the assembly points.
A leap frog system of attack, recently practised in training, was to be employed. The lead platoon was to take the first objective, the second platoon was to pass through to take the second objective, the third platoon the final objective. The fourth under the company commander were to be used for counter attack or consolidation according to the tactical situation.
26th Oct 1917
At 3am heavy rain began to fall again and at 4.05am the 4th Bn reported it was in position for the attack.
At zero hour, 5.40am, the barrage opened up and began to creep forward at a rate of one hundred yards every eight minutes. The fusiliers of the149th Bde rose to their feet to advance behind it, with the 4th & 5th Bn Loyal North Lancashires (57th Divn) on the right flank and the 35th Divn on the left. Had the 'going' been good, the troops who lay close up under the barrage (so close indeed that several casualties were suffered) waiting for the first "lift", would not have had a problem advancing at the rate of the creeping barrage.
'The rain had, however, done its deadly work, for all the gallant fellows could do was to drag themselves along through the thick clinging mud and water at a much slower pace than the barrage, which soon got ahead'. Then form "pill box" and shell hole murderous fire was poured upon them. Many fell dead; some of the wounded fell into the gaping holes of water and were drowned; fortunate were those who escaped, but on went the survivors'
The allied barrage consisted entirely of shrapnel and was therefore quite useless against the first objective, which consisted of concrete huts. To make matters worse the rain continued to fall heavily and the condition of mud and water were perfectly appalling.
Bn HQ received a wire from the Bde Major at 8.50am stating that a wounded Forward Observation Officer had reported that the first objective had been taken and the men were advancing well to the second objective. This information proved incorrect because 2nd Lt Wood subsequently returned wounded and reported that casualties were heavy and the attack was held up in front of the Huts. The attack had actually ground to a halt about eighty yards west of the line of huts. The machine gun fire and sniping was so severe that any further advance was quite impossible and reporting the situation back to HQ extremely difficult. Two runners were sent to the front line to try and gather information but they both failed to return.
At 11am, 2nd Lt Burton was sent forward to reconnoitre and he confirmed that the attack was held up about one hundred yards short of the Huts. At 1pm Sgt Thompson returned from the front line and confirmed 2nd Lt Burtons’ report stating that casualties were very heavy. Similar news was brought down later by Capt J.V. Gregory. This information was relayed to Bde HQ by pigeon and signaled by Lucas Lamp. Several messages were sent during the afternoon. Ttwo platoons from the Reserve Company, under the command of 2nd Lts Peddie and Scott, were sent forward at 6pm to consolidate the original line held before the attack.
The Bn was relieved about midnight by the 4th Bn East Yorks and proceeded, via the duckboard track known as Railway Street 7, to Rose Crossroads camp 8. The 6th Bn DLI organised straggler posts in likely places to round up men returning from the front line and to guide them to camp.
Roll call revealed the appalling casualties suffered by the 4th Bn. 2nd Lts D.A.Smith, and W.Ruddy had been killed in action with 2nd Lt R.A.A Simpson later dying of wounds. 2nd Lts G.R.Charlewood, A.W.P.Leary, H.B.Bell, J.R.Ruddock and R.Wood were wounded, and 2nd Lt R.G.Rayner and H Stobbs were missing. Thirty-six fusiliers had been killed, one hundred and fifty-six wounded and sixty four were still missing. A total of two hundred and fifty six, more than fifty percent of those that had gone into action. The 5th Bn fared even worse with a total of 12 officers and 439 men either killed, wounded or missing. 7th Bn losses amounted to 11 officers and 246 men.
Summary compiled from:
Records show that at least 100 fusiliers from the 4th Bn were actually killed in action or died of wounds between the 25th and 27th of Oct 1917. For information on 4th Bn burial and memorial sites for casualties sustained in this battle, select the link.
4th Battalion War Diary
The following is a list of points noted in the attack:-
1. Two machine guns were attached to the battalion in the attack. They went forward with the support company (in rear of 5th Bn) and did excellent work.
2. Two Stokes Mortars were to be attached but did not succeed in getting ammunition forward.
3. Communication to Bde exceptionally valuable and wonderfully maintained under a heavy barrage by the Bn. Signalling Officer (2nd Lt W.C.Clemitson) and the other signallers. The wire to 5th Bn almost instantly maintained, visual to Bde also kept up although the lamp was knocked over three times, and pigeons.
4. Wounded. Appalling difficulty in getting wounded as the slightest movement in the front line was checked by Machine Guns and sniping.
5. Liaison. Lt W.B. Hicks acted as liaison officer between the 4th Bn and the Bde on the right flank. Liaison with the 4th/5th Loyal North Lancashires maintained through 5th Northd Fus, who had an officer from that battalion with them.
6. Rations Cannot be brought up by transport in these conditions. Men must carry two days rations and also two Tommy cookers.
7. Kit as laid down appear the best, though many packs will probably be thrown away.
8. Hot food should always be carried up to the troops the night before the attack - also RUM.
9. Guiding appallingly difficult owing to the scarcity of landmarks, obvious landmarks, such as the railway are dangerous as the enemy naturally concentrates his artillery on them. We suggest a double line of pickets with plain wire on them. This is not conspicuous and very helpful.-
4th Battalion War Diary
(i) MESSAGES during the action
L.T.19 timed 12.20pm. Wounded officer left company reports attack on huts in V.1.D held up by many machine guns about 150 yards west of Huts. Right company held up in same position. Right company of SEED (5th NF) held up on same line. Impossible to work round flanks owing to swamp on right and machine guns on left. AAA. I have one company still in reserve in TAUBE FARM and TRANQUILLE HOUSE area AAA I do not propose to make another frontal attack with this company, as this appears to me to be a reliable report. AAA the officer states that Huts are very little damaged and full of machine guns AAA. Unless I receive orders to the contrary I will move Reserve Company up tonight at dusk to take over and reorganise front line AAA. Am investigating this information and will report later. AAA Ground very swampy and casualties very heavy in wounded officers company.
LT.20 timed 12.40pm In continuation of my L.T.19 I am unable to reach front line companies owing to machine gun fire and sniping from Huts and concrete emplacements. South of Huts. AAA There is not the slightest doubt that the whole attack is held up 100 to 150 yards west of Huts. I am unable to ascertain definitely position of troops on my right but they do not appear to have made much progress. AAA I am unable to estimate casualties.
LT 21 timed ? A very reliable Sgt has just brought back a report from front line. He states that 50 of our men and 2 officers are lying about 100 yards west of middle of Huts. Remainder of 3 companies, he thinks, are casualties. Total about 300. BOSCH planes have been flying low over front line shooting at them. Bosches have also sniped majority of our wounded as they tried to get back. Attack started in excellent order and was clear of BOSCH barrage before it came down – a few men succeeded in reaching HUTS but have not come back. Remainder caught by machine gun fire from HUTS and both flanks. Can you please give me assistance of large party to get our wounded out tonight with stretchers. It requires about 6 men per stretcher.
LT 22 timed 3.44pm Ref B.M.871
I am sending up 2 platoons tonight at dusk. They will consolidate original front line held before the attack and remaining 3 company’s will withdraw. I should like to send them out of the line. Is this possible please, and can staff captain arrange billets for them (probably 70 or 80 men). If the other company is not to be relieved, could you send water, rum, hot food and rations up for them and battalion HQ. Guides could meet ration parties and stretcher parties at PASCHAL FARM. I should also like a large carrying party with stretchers. Guides as above. – Sent by pigeon and substance of it by visual.
149th Bde War Diary
Speaking generally, the Bde was ordered to attack in a north-eastern direction between the southern border of the Houthhulst Forest 9 and the Broembeek 10 on a frontage running in an irregular manner through Aden House 11, and the principal objectives included "Hill 23 12," "Colbert Crossroads 13" and the groups of huts about seven hundred yards south-west of Schaap Balie 14. Aeroplane photographs were unfortunately not very clear, but they revealed an area that was capable of an obstinate defence, and one that might be rendered impassable by heavy rain. The chief obstacles were a double row of concrete huts or "pill-boxes," and ground that was already dangerously full of water- holes.
Heavy rain began to fall again at 3am and the "very few firm pieces of ground" became less in number; the water, trickling at first down the muddy sides of shell holes, soon became small streams, filling the occupants of the shell holes with gloomy prospects of success in the attack; pools of water widened almost to small lakes. Even in the darkness it was possible to discern stretches of water out in No Man's Land across which the attackers would have to pass.
2nd Passchendaele - Military Units
34th Division Comprised of the 101st, 102nd and 103rd Infantry Brigades
The 101st Bde - Comprised of the 15th and 16th Bn - Royal Scots, 10th Bn - Lincolnshire Regt and 11th Bn - Suffolk Regt.
The 102nd Bde - Comprised of the 20th, 21st, 22nd and 23rd Bn - Northumberland Fusiliers.
The 103rd Bde - Comprised of the 24/27th, 25th and 26th Bn - Northumberland Fusiliers.
35th Division - - Comprised of the 104th, 105th and 106th Infantry Brigades
The 104th Bde - Comprised of the 17th, 18th, 20th & 23rd Bns - The Lancashire Fusiliers.
The 105th Bde - Comprised of the 15th & 16th Bns - The Cheshire Regiment, 14th Bn - The Gloucestershire Regiment and the 15th Bn - The Sherwood Foresters.
The 106th Bde - Comprised of the 17th Bn - The Royal Scots, 17th Bn - The Prince of Wales' Own, 19th Bn - The Durham Light Infantry and the 18th Bn - The Highland Light Infantry.
50th (Northumbrian) Division Comprised of the 149th (Northumberland) Bde, 150th (York & Durham) Bde and 151st (Durham Light Infantry (DLI)) Bde.
The 149th Bde comprised of the 4th, 5th, 6th and 7th Bn Northumberland Fusiliers.
The 150th Bde comprised 4th Bn East Yorkshires, 4th Bn Green Howards, 5th Bn Green Howards and 5th Bn Durham Light Infantry
The 151st Bde comprised the 6th, 8th, 9th Bn - DLI and 1/5th (Cumberland) Bn - Border Regt
The 149th MGC -
57th (2nd West Lancashire) Division -
The 170th (2nd North Lancashire) Bde - Comprised of the 2/5th Bn - King’s Own, 2/4th, 2/5th & 4/5th Bn - Loyal North Lancashire Regt.
The 171st (2nd Liverpool) Bde - Comprised of the 2/5th, 2/6th, 2/7th & 2/8th Bn - King’s.
The 172nd (2nd South Lancashire) Bde - Comprised of the 2/9th & 2/10th Bn - King’s, 2/4th & 2/5th Bn - South Lancashire Regt.
Summary of events
With the exception of the 4th Bn (ordered to move to the old German line north of Beaurains) and two sections of the 149th MGC who were to support the attack of the 150th Bde, the 149th Bde was to remain in billets at Ronville 1 and Guemappe 2 was taken. The 4th Bn reached Buck Trench 3, and the Divn frontline was advanced to a point not far from the outskirts of Cherisy 4. HQ was established at Telegraph Hill 5
23rd April 1917 (St Georges Day)
At 4.15am the front line Bns were reported in position. The 150th Bde attack was to be carried out by the 4th Bn East Yorkshires on the right and the 4th Bn Green Howards on the left. Five minutes before Zero hour two tanks nosed their way to the front and moved slowly in a north-westerly direction.
At 8am the Bn moved forward again to the O.G. 1st line (map ref: N.5.b) and remained there during the day at half an hour notice. The Bn moved forward at five minutes notice at 7.45pm to the Brown Line 6 and for tactical purposes came under the orders of the GOC 151st Bde.
During the early morning of the 24th the 151st Bde relieved the 150th Bde, who moved back into reserve in the Harp area 7; the 4th Bn were attached to the 151st Bde, the remainder of the 149th being in support.
At about 11.30am, the enemy was reported retiring in front of the 30th Divn, and the GOC of the 30th Divn stated that he was going to push on to the Blue line 8.
The Bn moved forward from the Brown Line under the orders of the 151st Bde. ‘B’ Coy were sent forward to the front line and came under the orders of the 5th Bn DLI. They dug and occupied a new trench connected to the right flank of the 9th Bn DLI. Their covering party captured four Germans. No contact was made on the right flank until 3pm at which time communications were established with the 5th Bn Border Regt who were to the rear and slightly right of them. The 5th Bn Borders agreed to come forward at night and dig and occupy a trench that would be connected with ‘B’ Coy on the left.
‘A’, ’C’ and ‘D’ Coys and Bn HQ arrived at the old British front line north of Wancourt Tower (dispositions as per sketch) 2.30am. Rations were brought up to the 5th Bn Border HQ in the Long Lane 9 and brought up to ‘A’, ‘D’ and HQ by ‘C’ Coy. There was insufficient time to deliver rations to ‘B’ Coy before daylight so the men had to consume their second lot of iron rations. ‘B’ Coy were subjected to continuous, heavy shellfire and persistent sniping. 2nd Lt R Johnson and five men were killed and 16 men were wounded.
('B' Coy or the Bn) Lewis Guns identified good targets at ranges varying round 1000 yards and inflicted several casualties on the enemy. One Lewis gun was destroyed by shellfire. The areas occupied by the remaining Coys were also subjected to considerable artillery fire, which was especially violent between 2.30am and 7am and again between 1.30pm and 2pm. No direct hits were obtained on the trench and no casualties were sustained in this line during daylight.
2pm A part of ten stretcher-bearers and ten men were sent out to collect wounded still lying on the battlefield.
The GOC 151st Bde was instructed to advance at 4pm under an artillery barrage. But, meanwhile, the 30th Divn had already reached the Blue line, and was digging in on it, and the 151st Bde was, therefore, ordered to conform immediately to the movement of the 30th Divn. The 5th Borders Regt swung up their right flank and obtained touch at about 4pm. But the 9th DLI, in the centre, with a Coy of the 4th Bn attacked, and had a sharp tussle with the enemy before occupying the Blue Line 10. (50th Divn)
3pm ‘B’ Coy under 9th Bn DLI orders (2.25pm) went forward one platoon to reconnoitre and capture an enemy trench 600 yards long astride the railway. The platoon captured the trench sustaining three casualties in the process.
Bn HQ received Operation Orders at 3.30pm stating that the 15th Divn were advancing on the left and 9th Bn DLI would support their advance with rifle, Lewis Gun and MG fire. Also that they would push forward patrols to reconnoitre and capture the German trench six hundred yards long astride the railway. OC 9th Bn DLI detailed ‘B’ Coy for this work and captured and held the trench as described above.
At 5.22pm 4th Bn HQ received a wire from OC 9th Bn DLI stating that one of the 'B' Coy platoons had just captured an enemy trench (from map ref: O.20.7.6. to O.20.C.1.9) and was holding it. Only three casualties were incurred. Fine piece of work. Lt Col B.D. Gibson and 2nd Lt Burton went forward to reconnoitre the new positions occupied by ‘B’ Coy and ‘A’ and ‘D’ Coys.
Another platoon was sent forward under heavy artillery and machine gun fire to help hold it. Under cover of darkness one more platoon of ‘B’ Coy was sent forward to the trench and three strong points were constructed, two north and one south of the railway.
10pm ‘A’ and ‘D’ Coys dug a new support trench between the railway and the Cojeul River and occupied it. One machine gun was attached to each Coy. At 10.30pm Bn HQ moved to a dugout at the old German gun pits at the north end of old German support line between Cojeul River and the railway. ‘C’
2nd Scarpe - Military Units
15th (Scottish) Division - Comprised of the 44th, 45th and 46th Infantry Brigades
The 44th Bde - Comprised of the 9th Bn - Black Watch, 8th Bn - Seaforth Highlanders, 8th & 10th Bns - Gordon Highlanders, 7th Bn - Camerons.
The 45th Bde -Comprised of the 13th Bn - Royal Scots, 6th & 7th Bn - Royal Scots Fusiliers, 6th Bn - Camerons, 11th Bn - Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders.
The 46th Bde - Comprised of the 10th Bn - Scottish Rifles, 7th & 8th Bn Kings Own Scottish Borderers, 10th & 11th Bn - Highland Light Infantry, 12th Bn - Highland Light Infantry.
30th Division - Consisted of the 89th, 90th and 91st Bde.
The 89th Bde comprised of the 17th, 18th, 19th and 20th Bns - The Kings Liverpool Regiment
The 90th Bde comprised of the 16th, 17th, 18th and 19th Bns - The Manchester Regiment.
The 91st Bde comprised of the 20th, 21st, 22nd and 24th Bns - The Manchester Regiment.
50th (Northumbrian) Division Consisted of the 149th (Northumberland) Bde, 150th (York & Durham) Bde and 151st (Durham Light Infantry (DLI)) Bde.
The 149th Bde comprised of the 1/4th, 1/5th, 1/6th and 1/7th Bn Northumberland Fusiliers
The 150th Bde comprised 1/4th Bn East Yorkshires, 1/4th Bn Green Howards, 1/5th Bn Green Howards and 1/5th Bn Durham Light Infantry
The 151st Bde comprised the 1/6th, 1/8th, 1/9th Bn - DLI and 1/5th (Cumberland) Bn - Border Regt.
149th MGC -
Monday, 9th April 1917
When the British assault began at 5.30am on the 9th of April (Easter Monday), the 50th Division were still held in reserve, approximately 10 miles west of Arras. The 4th Bn were billeted at Beaufort 1 and the days were filled with training exercises.
At 9.30am that morning, all the Bn officers were conducting an outpost scheme on the ground between Beaufort and Manin 2 and at 2pm ‘C’ and ‘D’ Coys were exercised in a tactical scheme on the same ground.
At 11.30pm orders were issued to the three Infantry Bdes of the 50th Division to move to the Habarcq- Wanquetin area on the 10th. The 149th Bde were to occupy the Wanquetin-Hauteville area.
Tuesday, 10th April 1917
At 3pm the Bn, less ‘A’ and ‘B’ Coys, paraded opposite Beaufort church and marched via Avesnes-Le-Comte 3 and Hauteville 4 to arrive at a Nissen Hut camp at Wanquetin 5 around 5pm. The 150th Bde moved to Habarcq 6, the 151st Bde to Agnez 7, Gouves 8 and Montenescourt 9, the 7th Bn DLI (Pioneers) into Arras and Divn HQ opened in Berneville 10 at 4pm.
Wednesday, 11th April 1917
On this day the Divn was transferred from XVIII to VII Corps and commenced the relief of the 14th Divn. The 149th Bde were to take the first turn in the front line.
Training for the 4th Bn continued at Wanquetin, with‘C’ and ‘D’ Coys conducting bayonet training at 10am followed by a short march. At 3.30pm the snow began to fall again. During the afternoon the men's packs were stored and sandbags, very lights, grenades and flares were issued. A motor lorry delivered these stores to ‘A’ and ‘B’ Coys and brought their packs back to Wanquetin.
The 6th and 7th Bns set off at 5.15pm, marching eastwards straight through Arras and on to the trenches held by the 42nd Bde south of Tilloy. At 6pm, the 4th Bn (minus ‘A’ and ‘B’ Coys) paraded then marched, while the snow fell heavily, via Warlus, Dainville and Arras to Ronville Caves 11, arriving there at midnight. Guides from the 42nd Bde (14th Divn) were met at map reference - 9.27a.1.9. ' A' Coy having been relieved by the 150th Bde at Agnes-Les-Duisans 12, marched to join up with the Bn (minus ‘D’ Coy) at Warlus 13.
Despite the fact that snow was falling heavy, the men were ordered to ‘dump’ their great coats and to take only a blanket wrapped in a waterproof sheet as protection against the weather, consequently all ranks were soon in a wretched condition.
The 6th Bn took control of the trenches on the right flank of the 50th Divn sector straddling Telegraph Hill 14 and the 7th Bn the left flank. The 5th Bn moved into support, occupying the old German front line, the 4th Bn were held in reserve at Ronville Caves. The 1st line transport was stationed at the Citadelle 15 in Arras. The entire relief was complete by 3.35am.
Meanwhile, the 151st Bde moved up and relieved the 43rd Bde (14th Divn) in Ronville Caves, while the 150th Bde remained at Habarcq.
At 1am, in Ronville Caves, stores were issued to the 4th Bn:
Sandbags - 4 per man.
Flares - 2 per officer and man.
No 5 Mills Grenades - 40 per bombing section.
No 20 Hales Grenades - 40 per rifle grenade section.
Very Lights - 4 (2 white, 2 green) per officer, servant, CSM and platoon Sgt.
Thursday, 12th April 1917
“A chilly clear aired morning, the water standing everywhere in sheets after last nights snow and rain. Arras is crammed with troops of many different divisions. The town is comparatively little damaged, but there seem to be practically no civilians”. .
During the afternoon Lt Col Gibson, Major Robb and 2nd Lt Wilson reconnoitred the area around Tilloy-Les-Mofflaines 16 and Telegraph Hill . ‘B’ Coy marched from Beau tz Les L… and joined the 4th Bn at 9pm.
At midnight on the 12th GOC 50th Divn assumed command of the front line sector and Divisional HQ opened in Arras. The new sector was the northern part of the Hindenburg Line 17 and had only been captured during the attacks carried out between the 9th and 12th of April.
"The new sector occupied by the 50th Divn was on the ridge immediately east of the villages of Wancourt and Heninel. The river Cojeul ran north-easterly through Heninel past the eastern outskirts of Wancourt and then taking a sharp turn eastwards just south of Guemappe. The left flank of the Divn front rested on the river east of Wancourt, the right on the well defined building known as the Wancourt Tower, which stood upon the ridge east of Wancourt and Heninel. Southeast, but beyond the Divn right boundary lay Cherisy, while directly ahead was Vis-en-Artois. Guemappe, also in the German lines, was north of the Cojeul on the left front of the 50th Divn; machine gun fire from the village could rake the Divn front line in enfilade”.
Friday, 13th April 1917
Early on the 13th patrols carried out by the 9th Bn DLI reached the Cojeul River and dug in fifty yards east of Wancourt Tower 18.
At 11am, officers from 4th Bn HQ and each Coy reconnoitred the route from Ronville Caves to The Harp 19 (near Telegraph Hill). At 1pm Major Robb reconnoitred the route from Ronville Caves to Wancourt.
At 5pm the officers and men who had been detailed to remain behind when the Bn went into action marched back to billets in Arras.
That night, two Coys of the 9th Bn DLI were holding the front line from Wancourt Tower northwards for about six to seven hundred yards, and two coys were in a sunken road just east of the Cojeul River. Meanwhile orders had been issued that the VI and VII Corps would again advance on the 14th.
Saturday, 14th April 1917
The 151st Bde was to advance the attack in order to protect the left flank of the 56th Divn, who were tasked with capturing Cherisy, and form a defensive flank facing north along the high ground roughly just south of the 80 metre contour, with their left flank in Wancourt Tower. Zero hour was set for 5.30am. The 6th DLI would advance at zero hour with the 8th Bn DLI and 5th Bn Borders following later. This attack met with some success with the 6th Bn DLI reaching German trenches just south of Wancourt Tower. Wancourt Tower was destined to become the scene of continual fighting during the next few days because it commanded a view of all the Divns approaches from Telegraph Hill.
At 5.30pm the 4th Bn moved in coy and platoon order from Ronville Caves to the north end of 'The Harp' by the route reconnoitred earlier. The first to arrive discovered that the 7th Bn, whose positions the Bn were supposed to take over, were still there, so they had to lay down to the rear of the trench. However, during the move orders were received to move to 'Cojeul Switch' at the south end of 'The Harp' (map ref: N7A).
At 8pm, once the 5th Bn had moved forward from its positions, the Bn moved in.
The First Battle of the Scarpe officially ended on this day, however the 4th Bns involvement with this sector had only just begun.
Sunday, 15th April 1917
The 149th Bde relief of the 151st Bde was completed early in the morning. The 6th Bn assumed control of the trenches previously held by the 9th DLI and after ejecting the enemy established a post between the opposing lines in the ruins of Wancourt Tower. The 7th Bn manned the support lines with two Coys in Nepal Trench 20 and two along the bank east of the river Cojeul, the 5th Bn were in Niger Trench 21 and the 4th Bn in Cojeul Switch 22.
At 3.30pm the enemy were observed attempting to dig a sap towards Wancourt Tower, but a platoon from the 6th Bn were successful in thwarting this. A communication trench was subsequently dug running from the front line to the north of the tower. Two enemy bombing attacks were repulsed by the 6th Bn.
The 4th Bn remained in in The Harp (South) and Cojeul Switch throughout the day.
12th November 1916
‘B’ and ‘C’ Coys moved into Snag Trench 1 and Snag Support 2, ‘A’ Coy to Abbaye Trench 3 and ‘D’ Coy the Flers Line 4. The Bn was warned to be ready for an assault on Hook Sap 5. Lt Col. Gibson visited the front line system of trenches and reported that the communication trench was impassable in many places and the condition of Snag front line and support was extremely bad.
Snag Trench was 6ft wide and it was almost impossible to move along. In several instances men had become completely stuck in the mud and took over an hour to be dug out. Rifle fire was fairly heavy during early morning of the 12th. The German 5th Bn Grenadier Guards were now in the trenches opposite the Bn and were much more active than the Saxon Regt who were opposite on the previous tour in the trenches.
At 7.45am the enemy front line very heavily shelled.
At 10am the Bn received word that the attack on Hook Sap was postponed until the 14th and would be carried out by the 6th and 7th Bns. Work continued on Snag new support trench. Front line system was heavily shelled during the morning with the Bn suffering about twenty casualties with several men temporarily buried as well.
13th November 1916
Orders were received stating that the 1st Divn would relieve the 50th Divn between the 17th and 19th of November.
At 6.30pm, Bde HQ issued an operation order, detailing the 5th Bn to attack on the right flank and the 7th Bn on the left. The 4th Bn were to be held in support with two Coys in Hexham Road 6 and two in the Flers Line (with 5th Bn Green Howards attached). The 6th Bn were to hold the front line from the left of the 7th Bn to the Bde Boundary on the left and support the attack with Lewis Gun and rifle fire.
During the night of the 12th/13th Snag new support trench was dug and completed and Pioneer Alley 7 was cleared as far as possible. To make it passable approximately two hundred duck-boards were laid cross wise in Snag Trench.
At 5.45am a Chinese barrage 8 was laid down on Hook Sap and the Gird Line 9. With the artillery suddenly opening and the barrage steadily creeping forward, it gave the Germans the impression that an infantry assault was in progress.
'This of course, alarms the Bosche, who thinks we are coming over, and brings down all his artillery barrages too. These bombardments took place at 6am for several days’
Enemy retaliation was very severe especially on Hexham Road 10, where an intense barrage was put up for an hour. Bn once again had several casualties from shell-fire.
The relief of the Bn by the 5th Bn commenced at 8pm, ‘C’ and ‘D’ Coys moved back to the Flers Line, but ‘A’ and ‘B’ Coys remained at Hexham Road. The relief was completed at 11.45pm.
the 5th and 7th Bns moved into position during the night ready to attack Hook Sap and the Gird Line at 6.45am.
‘The position was now as follows. The 1st Divn had pushed the enemy back to a line running along the top of a ridge running from the Butte of Warlencourt practically due east. This ridge prevented our seeing the enemy’s approaches and support position in Le Barque. On the other hand from Loupart Wood the whole of our approaches and support trenches were in full view of the enemy, as far back as High Wood. Across these two miles no one could move in daylight without being seen by the enemy, and there was practically no position to put our field guns forward of High Wood. The enemys’ front line consisted of two trenches - Gird Line and Gird Support - with a forward trench on top of the ridge, called on the left ‘ Butte Trench and on the right ‘Hook Sap’. Our front line Snag Trench and Maxwell Trench lay this side of the ridge and about two hundred yards away from the German forward trench’.
‘The Butte of Warlencourt was a round chalk hill, rising about one hundred feet above ground level; and had been mined with deep dugouts and made into a formidable strong point. From the Butte, machine guns defended the approaches to Hook Sap, and the Hook Sap and the Gird line, machine guns defended the approaches to the Butte. The ground between and around the opposing trenches had been ploughed up with innumerable shells, some of huge calibre, and it was now a spongy morass, difficult to cross at a walk and impossible at a run. As events proved, unless both the Butte and the Gird Line could be taken at the same time, the one would render the other impossible to hold. This then was the problem that faced the 50th Divn, a problem that would have been difficult enough in the driest of weather, but rendered four times more so by the rain which fell in deluges on three days out of four during the whole of October and November’.
‘A’ and ‘D’ Coy were in Hexham Road and ‘B’ and ‘C’ Coy in the Flers Line when the 5th and 7th Bns went ‘over the top’ to attack Hook Sap, alongside troops from the 2nd Australian Divn. On this occasion mist obscured the attacking troops from the troops in the Flers Line. The enemy defensive barrage was very prompt, opening up within two minutes of zero hour.
The 19th Australian Bn in conjunction with the 5th and 7th Bns took Gird Support. However, the trench was waterlogged, so they fell back to Gird Trench. The 7th Bn appeared to have taken Hook Sap, but they came under severe fire from Butte Trench and nothing more was heard from them. The day wore on and counterattacks were fought off. Two Coys of the 20th (New South Wales) Bn attempted a move against the Maze at 4.45pm but were stopped by machine gun fire. .
At 10am Capt R.W. Cranage was slightly wounded by piece of shrapnel in Flers Line.
On receipt of this news a sap was begun running out from Snag Trench to Hook Sap, the men digging hard. This sap was begun by 'D' Coy of the 4th Bn, who had been detailed for the work in operation orders. But at 11.30am they had to cease digging as the enemy machine gun fire was too heavy (50th Divn)
‘D’ Coy, under the orders of the 7th Bn, proceeded from Hexham Road to the head of Pioneer Alley to continue this Communication Trench towards Hook Sap. Machine Gun fire was so heavy that the party returned to Hexham Road.
At 2.35pm ‘A’ Coy was placed at the disposal of the 5th Bn. At 5pm 2nd Lt T. Bonner and fifty men reinforced the Gird Line on right (held by 5th and 7th Bns) with bombs and occupy left flank portion of line next to enemy. This party was engaged in heavy bomb fighting all next day.
3.30pm Trenches .
CO moves to Hexham Road to meet GOC 149th Bde
At 5pm ‘B’ and ‘C’ Coys move up to Hexham Road. ‘D’ Coy moves up to Snag trench front line.
At 6.30pm ‘B’ Coy moved to Snag trench to dig a Communication Trench from the head of Pioneer Alley to Hook Sap. ‘C’ Coy moved to Snag left of Pioneer Alley. Capt J.W. Robinson (OC ‘B’ Coy) was killed while leading a patrol reconnoitring Hook Sap.
At 11pm Lt Col B.D. Gibson and Maj N.I. Wright (5th Bn) went forward to reorganise the front line prior to an attack. For this task they had one Coy from the 4th and 7th Bns on the left and another Coy from the 4th Bn and the remains of 'A' Coy from the 7th Bn about thirty men.
The two coys in Starfish Trench went forward and occupied positions in Prue Trench vacated by the 7th Bn, who had gone further forward. Later in the day these Coys were recalled as the 7th Bn were returning there. The Bn expected to be relieved that night, but at 3pm orders were received that stating the the 4th and 7th Bn should relieve the Durhams in the front line. The 4th Bn relieved the 8th Bn DLI and 5th Bn Borders. The weather and the mud was appalling and a large number of bombs had to be carried forward, so the men were absolutely exhausted. The relief was not completed until about 9am on the morning of the 3rd.
15th November 1916
Trenches, Hexham Road & Snag Trench
At 12.30am the 4th and 5th Bns launched an attack but owing to intense enemy barrage and heavy rifle and Machine gun fire the attack failed. Capt J.W. Robinson and 2nd Lt F.J. Larken were killed, Lt Col B.D. Gibson and 2nd Lt T. Bonner were wounded and 2nd Lt A.V. Berrick was missing.
At midnight a detachment of the 4th and 5th Bns attacked on the other flank and similar results were achieved. (McCarthy. p.156).
At 2am the Bn was ordered to reorganise and defend Snag Trench. Lt Col Gibson and Wright returned to Bn HQ as nothing more could be done for the present.
Enemy shelling fairly heavy all day.
16th November 1916
The Bn, including the party in the Gird Line, was relieved by the 4th Bn East Yorks and moved back to the Flers Line. The Bn War Diary shows that the operations between the 14th and 16th of November resulted in the 4th Bn suffering 21 men killed, 62 wounded and 5 missing.
On the afternoon of the 17th the Bn was relieved by the 10th Bn Gloucesters (1st Divn) and move back to Bazentin Le Grand 11.
At 12 noon on the 18th the Bn proceeded by rail to Albert and was billeted in Felix Faure.
Records show that at least 40 fusiliers from the 4th Bn were killed in action or died of wounds during the fighting for Gird Trench and Hook Sap. For information on 4th Bn burial and memorial sites for casualties sustained in this battle, select the link.
Gird Trench, Hook Sap - Military Units
1st Division - Comprised of the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Infantry Brigades.
The 1st Bde - Comprised of the 10th Bn - Gloucestershire Regt, 1st Bn - Black Watch, 8th Bn - Royal Berkshire Regt and 1st Bn - Queen’s Own Cameron Highlanders.
The 2nd Bde - Comprised of the 2nd Bn - Royal Sussex Regt, 1st Bn - Loyal North Lancashire Regt, 1st Bn - Northamptonshire Regt and 2nd Bn - King’s Royal Rifle Corps.
The 3rd Bde - Comprised of the 1st Bn - South Wales Borderers, 1st Bn - Gloucestershire Regt, 2nd Bn - Welsh Regt and 2nd Bn - Royal Munster Fusiliers.
Pioneer Battalion - 1/6th - Bn Welsh Regt.
50th (Northumbrian) Division - Comprised of the 149th (Northumberland) Bde, 150th (York & Durham) Bde and 151st (Durham Light Infantry (DLI)) Bde.
The 149th Bde was comprised of the 1/4th, 1/5th, 1/6th and 1/7th Bns - Northumberland Fusiliers.
The 150th Bde was comprised 1/4th Bn - East Yorkshires, 1/4th & 1/5th Bn - Green Howards and 1/5th Bn - Durham Light Infantry.
The 151st Bde was comprised the 1/6th, 1/7th, 1/8th and 1/9th Bns - Durham Light Infantry (DLI). 1/5th (Cumberland) Bn, Border Regt.
“The battalion behaved splendidly, rather to the astonishment of the officers. The embarkation officer and disembarkation gave us some encouragement. It took the battalion exactly thirteen minutes to leave the boat, form up and march off. As the record disembarkation for a battalion is twelve minutes, we did pretty well. Had to march about three miles after disembarking, up a very long hill; pretty well cooked when we got into camp, as everybody was carrying blanket and waterproof sheet, in addition to full marching order. Slept in bivouac tents, very cold and wet”. (4th Bn Officer, Hexham Courant - 1 May 15).
At 11am, after the Bn parade and usual inspection, the entire Northumbrian Divn marched four miles over very dusty roads to Pont de Briques, to await a train. The men were very cheerful, practising their French on everyone they passed. The train arrived after a short while and the Bn discovered that the transport and machine gun sections, under the command of Capt Webster, Lt Bell and Lt Good, were already aboard. They had sailed from Southampton to Le Havre a few days before. The officers boarded first class carriages while thirty men clambered into each of the covered cattle wagons coupled behind. The train departed at 2pm and steamed slowly toward the northeast with the wagon side doors left open, so the men were able to sit on the steps and enjoy the fresh air and pretty countryside. It was only a short distance but it was past 6pm when the Bn disembarked at Bavinchove 4.
‘D’ Coy were tasked with unloading the transport wagons, while the rest of the Bn marched to their billets for the night. With the unloading complete and the wagons harnessed, 'D’ Coy set off in the same direction, but it would seem that the billeting officer had not explained precisely where their billets were located. They had marched two miles before they were informed that they should be in a farmhouse close to the station they had just left. The billets were eventually located and by 9.20pm the entire Coy were crowded, but comfortably settled in one large shed.
Normal protocol was adhered to, with all the Bn officers allocated rooms in the farmhouse while the NCOs and men bedded down on straw in the outbuildings and barns. The outbuildings allotted to ‘A’ Coy were not large enough to accommodate them all, so many had to bivouac outside. It was no hardship on this occasion, because it was a fine and warm night. However, those outside could not fail to notice the flashes of distant artillery fire and shell bursts in the sky to the east.
The Bn interpreter was billeted with the officers of one Coy:
“Monsieur and Madame of the farm were very kind. We had omelettes, coffee and schnapps for supper, and cutlets for breakfast. The old lady made us rather realise that it isn’t all a picnic. Her son had died of typhoid, and she wished us ‘Bonne chance’ and wept over us many times when we left next morning”. (4th Bn officer: HC - 1 May 15)
After assembling outside the station at 10am, the Bn marched seven miles northwards, up the steep winding road to the hill top town of Cassel and on to Oudezeele, arriving at 3pm. On the outskirts of Oudezeele they past billets occupied by the York and Durham Bde and DLI Bde. Once again the Bn were billeted in farms, but many of them were quite small, so the Coys were split into platoons and allotted a farm each.
“The Colonel and Cruddas came and inspected the Coy in the evening and read out a list of the field punishments to which men are liable on active service, together with certain death sentences that have recently been promulgated for various offences in the field”. (Bunbury)
“Country very pretty, difficult to realise that war is so near; can occasionally her the boom of a big gun. Each platoon is billeted in a different farm. All within a radius of half a mile. Found two platoons of the 6th Durhams already in our billets. As however, they were allotted to us they move out tonight. The farm I am in is very comfortable and people very kind”. (4th Bn officer, Hexham Courant: 1 May 1915)
Whilst the fusiliers were settling into their billets, twenty miles to the north-east the Germans were preparing to use their latest weapon for the first time. At 5pm, after an eleven hour delay due to a lack of wind, Chlorine gas was released from 6000 cylinders opposite front line trenches occupied by French colonial troops of the 45th (Algerian) Divn. The trenches were near Langemarck in the northern part of a bulge in the front line around the ancient Belgium town of Ypres, held jointly by the French and British army. This bulge, known as the Ypres Salient, covered a low lying farming area criss-crossed by drainage ditches.
A light north-easterly wind blew the greenish yellow cloud of gas towards the Algerians and was accompanied by heavy and concentrated shelling of Ypres, nearby villages and the French forward trenches. The gas was heavier than air so it sank into all the trenches in its path, choking and asphyxiating the occupants.
The effect was devastating:
“Those who were not incapacitated by the gas fled in terror leaving a gap in the line of approximately four miles. Some elements of the French Divn on the right flank managed to hang on. The Canadians were also severely affected by the gas. A four-mile stretch of the front line was left wide open. The German infantry units equipped with respirators advanced behind the barrage fifteen minutes after the gas was released”.
“...the German soldiers simply walked forward through the allied line, over the bodies of the dead, lying sprawled out, faces discoloured and contorted in grimaces of agony. Within an hour the Germans had advanced more than a mile and they had hardly needed to fire a shot” (MacDonald: p.195).
However, the Germans failed to press home their advantage and the pause in the enemy's advance gave the British valuable time in which to push troops forward to fill dangerous gaps in the line. Nevertheless, the threat posed to Ypres and the channel ports beyond would determine the immediate future of the Northumbrian Divn.
News of the German attack reached Maj. Gen. Sir W.F.L Lindsay (GOC Northumbrian Divn 5) at 10.40pm. Ten minutes later orders arrived instructing him to have six coys of the York and Durham Bde fully equipped and ready to move by motor bus. At 11.29pm a supplementary order was received stating that all units of the Northumberland Bde were to 'stand by' in billets, ready to turn out immediately, fully equipped.
At 11.48pm the 10th and 16th Bns (1st Canadian Divn) counterattacked in an attempt to recapture Kitchener's Wood. The wood was of great tactical advantage to whoever controlled it, as it lay on a small ridge running north from the village of St Julien, protecting it from the northwest. The attack was partially successful in that the Germans were cleared from most of the wood and a new line was established on its southern edge.
During the early hours of the morning a hastily assembled force of part battalions known as Geddes detachment advanced and succeeded in linking the Canadian position, south of Kitcheners Wood, with the Yser Canal.
The French planned to counterattack over the ground lost the previous afternoon. At a meeting in Cassell 6 between the French General Foch and Sir John French, Sir John agreed to co-operate in the attempt. On returning to his HQ at Hazebrouck, Sir John decided to increase the strength of the 2nd Army (GOC - General Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien) by placing the three infantry Bdes of the Northumbrian Divn at its disposal.
At 5.30am Northumbrian Divn HQ received orders from General HQ for two Infantry Bdes to be held in readiness to move. At 6.30am Northumberland Bde HQ received orders from Divn HQ, instructing them to concentrate the Bde around the town of Winnezeele. These orders were issued to the four Bns at 6.45am.
The 4th Bn cleaned their billets before assembling at 7.30am, just outside the village on the road east to Winnezeele 7. They marched off under the impression that they were moving a little closer to the front line and to a fresh billeting area, but it was at 9.05am that the Northumbrian Divn was placed at the disposal of the 2nd Army (now under the command of Gen. Sir H. Plumer). At 10.20am the Bde was brought to a halt on the outskirts of Winnezeele, the officers assuming this was so that the colonel and interpreter could inspect and allocate billets to the Bn, but a rumour soon spread that there had been developments at the front, necessitating a change to the programme. In actual fact, all four infantry Bns had been halted alongside Bde HQs, where they were to spend an uncomfortable three hours exposed to a cold wind awaiting orders. Meanwhile, the York and Durham, and Durham Light Infantry Bdes had been attached to the 28th Divn and were moving towards the front line.
Orders for the Northumberland Bde arrived at Divn HQ in Steenvoorde from HQ 2nd Army at 11.45am. They stated that the Bde, accompanied by a RE Field Company and supply section train, were to march from Winnezeele via Doglandt, Watou 8 and Poperinghe 9 and occupy the third line defences astride the Poperinghe-Ypres road near the town of Brandhoek.
Bns received these orders from Bde HQ at 12.30pm, at which time cases of maps were opened by the roadside and distributed among the officers and NCO’s. The Bde marched off shortly after 1pm, the 5th Bn leading the way, closely followed by the 6th, 7th and 4th Bns, 2nd Field Coy RE, 1st Northumberland Field Ambulance, No2 Coy ASC Train. This was a tough march for the fusiliers, over fourteen and a half miles of dry and dusty roads through flat farming country, laden down with heavy packs and equipment and lacking sustenance from a good meal. The troops crossed the Franco-Belgian frontier that afternoon, reaching the GHQ Line trenches astride the Ypres-Poperinghe road by 5.30pm. The Bns took up position, with the 4th and 7th to the north and the 5th and 6th to the south side of the road. Bde HQ was established at a farmhouse three miles east of Poperinghe. Three platoons from each Coy occupied the trenches, while the fourth was positioned in a wood a short distance to the rear.
"We were apparently about five or six miles in rear of firing line. Muttering of guns has developed into a pretty considerable noise”.
"It was not very easy to see our position in the dark, but we were not very long before we were in our places for the night”.
"We started on what proved to be a frightfully long march. We spent the night in the trenches, there was a good way behind the firing line. We could hear the guns very close, and also could see Ypres on fire”.
“At 4.15pm an attack took place between Kitcheners Wood and the canal. It certainly had the effect of stopping the enemy’s advance in this quarter, but the price paid had been very heavy, and actually no ground was gained that could not have been secured, probably without casualties, by a simple advance after dark, to which the openness of the country lent itself”.
Meanwhile, at 4pm the Durham Light Infantry Bde was ordered to move to Poperinghe and Vlamertinghe and at 8pm were placed at the disposal of V Corps.
The heavy losses incurred during the 23rd led to the York and Durham Bde receiving orders late that night to move to Brielen Bridge on the Yser Canal, to the north of Ypres. They were to be attached to, and support if required, the 13th Bde (5th Divn).
The York and Durhams assembled at 1am and marched towards the canal. Soon after dawn a German bombardment caused the first Northumbrian Divn casualties of the war, when a few shells burst amongst the York and Durhams sheltering on the canal banks. The bombardment preceded a German gas attack and infantry assault, which at 3.30am, was made against a sector north east of St Julien, held by the 8th and 15th Bns (Canadian 1st Divn). This time the Canadian troops were prepared for the gas, as each man had been supplied with cotton wads to soak in water and place over their mouth and nose. Nevertheless, despite stiff resistance from the Canadians, by 6.30am their line was breached. Two York and Durham Bns were ordered forward from the canal bank at 7.40am to man the GHQ line and support the Canadians. By 9am the Canadians were forced to withdraw to Locality 'C', where eventually they were surrounded and either killed or taken prisoner. By 3pm the Germans occupied the village of St Julien.
The Northumberland Bde was left to rest for most of the day, although subject to continual harassment from German spotter planes and artillery . Some of the men were set to work, in the woods to the rear of the trenches, building camouflaged shelters from waterproof sheets and blankets in an effort to avoid the spotter planes and the weather. At 3.45pm the Northumberland Bde received orders to march via Ypres to the village of Potijze to form a V Corps reserve.
“We fully expected that we should be left in the reserve trenches for some days, as up till now all the troops that have come out have been put into billets some way in the rear of the front line, while first the officers, and then the NCOs and men are sent up to the trenches in small parties, or by platoons, to familiarise them with the conditions, previous to the battalion going up as a unit”.
At 6pm the Bde formed up on the road and marched towards Ypres, passing streams of wounded men and Red Cross cars heading in the opposite direction. Rumours were rife in the ranks as to the reason for the advance, most numerous were that the allies had made a successful attack and broken the German lines through which they were to advance. Heavy rain began to fall and the Bde received its baptism of fire on entering Ypres around 11pm. Many of the buildings were on fire and the streets were strewn with corpses because the town was now under continual artillery bombardment.
“By keeping in close to the houses along the edges of the streets and square, and by doubling past places where the houses had been knocked down, we made pretty good progress without suffering any casualties. When we reached the further side of the square, however, were hung up, and had to halt for about twenty minutes exactly opposite the Cathedral and Cloth Hall” .
It would seem that the hold up, which may have been as long as an hour, was due to the Bde in front losing its way. During that halt fifteen men from the 7th Bn were hit, twenty-four horses and mules belonging to the 4th Bn's Transport Section were killed and several wagons were smashed. The personal steeds of Colonel Foster and Captain Cruddas were amongst the casualties and one of the wagons happened to be the Head Quarters section mess cart, which was flung sky high complete with the plates, cutlery and other such comforts.
Meanwhile, General E.A.H Alderson (GOC - 1st Canadian Divn) had issued Operation Order 10 at 8pm, ordering a strong counterattack to be made the following morning, in the general direction of Fortuin, St Julien and Kitcheners Wood. The aim was to drive the enemy back as far north as possible, thus securing the left flank of the 28th Divn. The counterattack was to be made by the 10th Bde, York/Durham Bde and two Bns from the 13th Bde under the command of Brigadier Hull (GOC 10th Bde). The Northumberland Bde and Durham Light Infantry Bde were destined to form a Corps reserve at Potijze, that could be called upon to support the attack if necessary.
Everyone was extremely relieved when the order to march finally came. Marching at quick pace, the Bn reached the village of Potijze. Still under shellfire, they turned into a large field to the right of the road and were ordered to lie down in small groups of about six men so that the risk of suffering heavy losses was minimized.
At 1.30am the Northumberland Bde was also placed under the command of the 10th Bde and ordered to move to a position near the village of Wieltje, to provide support for them in the forthcoming counterattack. It was almost dawn before the Bn rose to continue the march along flooded and almost impassable roads. By this time approximately 30 shells had exploded in the field around them, one man had been wounded and Lt Scaife temporarily struck dumb through concussion.
After two miles there was another unexplained stop in a narrow lane followed by a further short march before the Bn deployed in the fields immediately to the east of the Ypres-Wieltje and ‘Oxford’ road junction, on the outskirts of the ruined village of Wieltje.
Here they were ordered to lie down in extended order, with a thirty yard interval between Coys, the lead Coys just outside the village, with ‘A’ Coy about one hundred yards to the rear.
The York/Durham Bde (5th Bn Green Howards and 5th Bn DLI) were ordered to move to the right through Fortuin and were there by 5am, but realising they were alone and exposed on both flanks, fell back to their former positions. They were alone because there had been insufficient time to assemble the Bns at the correct start position and unbeknown to them, zero hour had been postponed from 3.30am to 5.30am.
The five battalions of the 10th Bde arrived at the GHQ Line to discover that there were only two breaks in the wire through which they could advance. As soon as they had passed through the wire heavy rifle and machine gun fire from St Julien and the adjacent buildings began to cut swathes through their lines. The attack failed to achieve the objectives set, but a new line was established with its apex at Vanheule Farm, five hundred yards from the edge of St Julien.
When General Hull discovered that the York and Durham Bde were not to the right of his 10th Bde, he ordered the Northumberland Bde, (Corps reserve), to send two Bns to positions south of Fortuin to reinforce the right flank. Bde HQ dispatched the 4th and 7th Bns at 7.30am.
“We got off about 3.30 and took up our position, and at 4am our artillery started to shell the Germans. What a row that was. The German guns replied and several of our fellows were hit. Later in the morning we advanced about 500 yards and in doing so we suffered a few casualties, whilst Joicey and Wilf Robinson were also wounded on that day. We did not get much more to do but were rather troubled by a machine gun and a sniper. Once we took up position along the side of a garden, but an aeroplane spotted us and we soon got shelled out of it”. (4th Bn officer, HC - 1 May 15).
The 4th and the 7th Bns set off in artillery formation, but when they reached the wire entanglements in front of the foremost trench line, just below the village, Colonel Foster was informed that the attack had already failed. At this stage all he could do was to try and save his men by stopping the Battalions from advancing. Unfortunately, he only succeeded in stopping the two companies bring up the rear of the 4th Bn, the other two having passed out of sight in the rear of the 7th Battalion. He ordered these two companies to occupy the front line trenches they had just reached. Unwittingly, instead of strengthening the line they had extended it to the right, but there was still no contact with the 5th Green Howards and 5th DLI, who had by this time returned to their old trenches in front of Fortuin.
“We advanced in artillery formation and then extended into successive lines under machine gun fire, which appeared to be coming from our flank. This became so severe that eventually I had to change direction with the two platoons I had with me, it was here that Joicey and a number of men were hit, and we found it impossible to advance till they were located. This we did after some trouble and were able to get the artillery directed on them, so we remained till dark and dug ourselves in. At 11pm we got the order to return to our original line, where we again entrenched ourselves and got what sleep we could”. (4th Bn Officer, HC - 15 May 15).
It was from these battered trenches that the Canadians had launched their attack, and judging from the numbers of the dead who were lying there, they must have met with murderous fire as they went over the top. The trenches were badly smashed up and consisted of little more than a series of ditches and scrap-heaps, while all around were the saddest indications of the sort of fighting which had taken place. The two Companies spent the afternoon removing the dead and doing what they could to repair the trench.
Meanwhile, at 6.30am Northumberland Bde HQ responded to 10th Bde orders by sending the 6th Bn to the GHQ line east of the farm (map ref: C22t), where they remained until dusk The 5th Bn remained in reserve at Wieltje. At 9.45am General Hull wired GHQ with the news that the attack had failed.
At 7.30pm the Northumberland Bde was placed in reserve under the orders of Lt General E.A.H Alderson (GOC - 1st Canadian Divn). At 7.45pm units were ordered to leave their current positions and to bivouac for the night just to the south of Wieltje. The 4th Bn were relieved between 11pm and midnight and withdrew by Coys under intense artillery fire to their original line near Wieltje. Here they dug in and slept as best they could until 5am.
'A' Coy under Lt Bunbury brought up the rear, but unable to locate the rest of the Bn they had no choice but to lay down and rest by the roadside, within 100 yards of an artillery battery that continued to fire all night. That day Capt Weirs’ arm had been shattered by shrapnel whilst attending a wounded man, Lt Joicey was shot through the leg, Robinson junior, through the foot, while Webster had to return to the lines with a sprained ankle. Thirty-three men had been wounded and twenty were missing, although most reported in the next day.
General Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien issued Operation Order No8 at 2.15am. The French were to launch an attack with their right flank on the Ypres- Langemarck road.
“At the same time the Lahore Division and troops under General Aldersons’ command, were to recapture much of the ground recently lost. The Lahore Divn was to advance through V Corps positions to attack in the direction of Langemarck, on a thousand-yard front. At the time they were bivouacking near Outerdom, some ten kilometres to the south west of Ypres. They had already marched thirty miles from Bethune to get there and, undisturbed by the clamour of the distant bombardment, most of them were sleeping like logs. By 5.30am they were back on the road, setting off at half-hour intervals to march through Ypres to take up positions north of the St Jean-Wieltje road in preparation for the attack”. (Macdonald: p.251).
‘A’ Coy awoke to find a thick mist covering the ground. As soon as they had eaten, they set off across country to rejoin the rest of the Bn, whose positions near Wieltje were now known. The rest of the Bde was also concentrated around Wieltje, under the orders of the 1st Canadian Divn and ready to act as reserve in the forthcoming attack. Lt Bunbury was in hope that the Bn would be moved further back from the front line, but they soon discovered that they were destined to move forward again. That morning the 4th Bn was placed in good trenches a little to the east of Wieltje and subjected to a heavy artillery bombardment as German spotter planes flew overhead unhindered.
At 10.15am Brigadier General J.F.Riddell (GOC Northumberland Bde) received orders from the GOC 10th Bde to verify a 28th Divn report that stated the enemy was breaking through the front line near Fortuin. At 10.45am the 5th Bn was directed to send forward an officers patrol to verify the report and to move the Bn forward to Fortuin in preparation for a counterattack if the enemy was discovered breaking through. By 12 noon OC 5th Bn was satisfied that the enemy was not attempting to break through at the place indicated. The Bn was subject to heavy shell fire, so they dug in and remained there until dusk, consequently taken no part in the operations of the afternoon.
At 12.15pm General Alderson issued Operation Order No 12, instructing a Bn from the 10th Bde to advance alongside the Lahore Division, between Kitcheners Wood and the Wieltje-St Julien road. At the same time, the Northumberland Bde was to attack St Julien astride the Wieltje-St Julien road. When the artillery barrage commenced at 1.20pm, the Bns detailed for the attack were to advance to the positions from which it would be launched at 2.05pm.
It was not until 1.30pm that Brigadier-General Riddell received these orders, so he had to summon the 4th, 6th and 7th battalion commanders immediately. He stated, that in the opinion of the Commander-in-Chief, it was imperative for the Germans to be kept out of Ypres and that the only way to do this was to fling more men into the breach, make rapid attacks and counter-attacks and to give the enemy the impression that there were large reserves to call upon. Lt Col Foster was instructed to advance an attack with the 4th Bn in a north-easterly direction with their left flank on the Wieltje-St Julien road. The 6th Bn were to advance with their right flank on the road and the 7th Bn were detailed to provide support for the 4th Bn. The fusiliers of the 4th Bn were just finishing their lunch when Colonel Foster returned with the orders, but by 1.50pm they were all on the move. Lt Col Foster called for his four company commanders and issued orders for the battalion to advance in lines of platoons at fifty yard intervals. Two companies, under the command of Major Stephenson, were to be in the first line and two in the rear under the command of the colonel himself.
According to Lt Bunbury no further information or detail was provided, so when the attack began few if anyone in the Bn had any idea where the allied front line trenches were in this part of the line, or what the objective of the attack was. The report submitted by Bde HQ after the action highlights the difficulties:
“The distance from Wieltje to St Julien was approximately 13/4 miles and the ground had not been previously reconnoitred by the staff or any of the officers of the Brigade. No information was received or could be obtained as to the actual position of either our own or the enemy's trenches nor was it known that the GHQ line was strongly wired and that there were only certain places through which the troops would be able to pass.
No communication was ever made with the artillery and no artillery officers got in any way into touch with the Brigadier. The time was short, the order to attack being received at 1.30pm, nevertheless considering that any failure to attack on the part of the Brigade might seriously hamper the operations General Riddell decided to carry out the orders he had received impossible as they seemed”.
The 4th and 6th Bns reached the GHQ line (map ref: C22b & C23c) and were deployed either side of the Wieltje-St Julien road by 2.05pm, immediately coming under heavy shell, machine gun and rifle fire. The thick wire entanglements in front of the GHQ line caused delay and heavy losses, as the men bunched together to squeeze through the gaps. Nevertheless, the wire was negotiated and the advance towards St Julien commenced.
Lt Bunbury wrote:
“We lost no time in getting away, and as soon as we passed through the barbed wire entanglements in front of our trenches, we set off in lines of platoons at about forty yards' interval. Plummer, Turner, and Varvill went with our first line two platoons, and Frank Robinson and myself followed with the other two (Nos 1 and 2).
Practically from the moment we started off we had to face a perfectly hellish shelling, which increased in intensity as we advanced. Shells of every description literally raining on us from our front, right flank and rear, while it seemed to me in the excitement of the advance that our artillery were giving us no support whatever.
The line of our advance lay for about a mile over open ground, and after we had gone a short way, in addition to the inferno of shells in which we were, we became exposed to a very heavy rifle and machine gun fire from the German trenches, which were directly in front of us near a wood at the top of some rising ground, and in such a position that they could fire right over what turned out to be our advanced trench, down on to us. The small arm fire was intense, and the nearest thing I can liken it to is a gigantic swarm of angry bees buzzing all around one. Men were falling on every side, and I felt an intense excitement, but there was no time for thinking, and my one idea was to push on as fast as possible, and to get as many men as possible to follow me, and keep going”.
Under circumstances such as these, Companies and Battalions soon get mixed up, and the last point at which I knew I had the major part of my own men still with me was after I had gone about half way, when we had to cross the St Julien road, and here we lay down for a breather.
“Frank Robinson was the only one of our officers I remember being there, and we appeared to have about a hundred men still with us, though the various lines were already getting mixed, and a good number of them were not belonging to our Company. From here we could see a trench some hundreds of yards in front of us, which with the scanty instructions we had received might have proved to be a German one, but I am thankful to say that I gave orders not to fire, as it turned out to be our own advanced trench occupied by the Seaforths. One could scarcely hear one's own voice for the awful din, and it was only by shouting at the top of of one's voice from mouth to mouth that an order could be conveyed any distance, This was not a very healthy place to stay in, and we did not remain there many minutes, and when FR and I got up to lead forward again the men, who were perfectly splendid throughout, rose and followed us like one man, the order to advance being scarcely needed. From this point on we were in full view of the German position, and men were falling thicker than ever, but we kept plugging along as fast as we could with our heavy packs, etc., and the perspiration was fairly pouring off me, as though I was in bad training, instead of being hard as nails. After we had gone a short way, I fancied that we were being shot at from a farm which was about two hundred yards to our right, and was in the act of swinging some men round to attack this when some RAMC men appeared in the door of the building, and signalling frantically to us not to fire, waved us on in our original direction, which we then resumed. When still about 200 yards behind our advanced trench, we came to a ditch and bank running across our line of advance, and I had a second breather of a few minutes here, and, while peeping over the parapet to choose the line for our further advance, something struck the parapet, sending a quantity of dirt in my face, and simultaneously I felt something hot touch my cheek, and for a moment thought that I had been hit. I turned to a man behind me, and asked him if I was hit, but he told me that it was only a graze, and that there was only a tiny trickle of blood. It was a narrow shave, but left no more mark than a small razor cut would. I then went on again, but by this time I only had a hazy recollection of seeing Frank Robinson somewhere near me still, as we were approaching the trench. Just about this time I had another close shave, as a 'Jack Johnson' burst, as it seemed, just over my head, and the concussion threw me face downwards on to the ground, while when I looked round, previous to rising to go on again, there was a huge hole just behind me, and several of the men following me were lying wounded on either side, while where it had actually fallen there was no trace of a soul and I fear that three or four of the poor fellows were blown into little bits r pounded into the ground. I eventually landed up at our trench, practically I believe at the same time as Frank Robinson, and accompanied by but a few men, several of whom were not even of our Battalion” (Bunbury: p...).
Meanwhile Lt Col Foster had stopped for a breather when several of his men, lying in a shallow ditch behind a hedge, had beckoned him.
“I was very glad to do so for we needed the rest, but the few minutes I could give them seemed to pass in a moment’s flash, and at the word of command; “Now, lads, we have some way to go yet, - we must get on’.” They jumped up on the instant and followed me.
Looking back as I lay upon the ground after one of our rushes, I saw men being blown twenty feet into the air by the bursting shells and, realising that as there was no cover the quicker we advanced the less we should suffer, I sprang up and ran ahead, shouting to the men to come on as fast as possible” (Foster: p.20).
By 2.45pm the remnants of the 4th and 6th Bns had reached the front line trenches (map ref: C17b) and the 7th Bn had joined the attack. Around 3.10pm isolated parties of the 6th Bn pushed forward a further 250 yards to occupy trenches from which the enemy had apparently retired. Elements of the Bn actually succeeded in entering, and for a time occupying the southern portion of St Julien, but they were eventually driven back, mainly due to the effects of gas, and finally occupied a line a short distance to the south.
During the whole of this period the Lahore Divn and the Bn from the 10th Bde were not seen. It was subsequently discovered that their orders had been cancelled and the Northumberland Bde had not been informed.
The 4th Bn fusiliers who were lucky enough to reach the advanced trenches unscathed were surprised to find they were occupied by a few Seaforth Highlanders (2nd Bn, 10th Bde). To Colonel Fosters' distress, he discovered that eight of the highlanders had been wounded by his men during the advance. Hardly surprising because the Colonel had not been informed that there were still British units in his line of attack. A steady trickle of fusiliers were reaching the trench and it was soon full, so some men had to dig into the rear of it.
Crawling along the shallow trench Lt Col Foster was pleased to find Col Jackson and Major Joicey of the 7th Battalion, and Lts Bunbury and Cranage of the 4th had survived. Right at the very end of the trench he found Capt Dixon and Lt Gibson.
At 3.45pm, Brig Gen Riddell left Bde HQ in the support trench (map ref: C23a) and went forward, accompanied by his Bde Major, to confer with his Bn Cdrs. At a point about one hundred and fifty yards south of Vanheule Farm (map ref: C17d) he was shot in the head and died instantly. As the senior officer in the front line, Lt Col Foster (OC 4th Bn) assumed command of the Bde and ordered all three Bns to dig in where they were as best they could. A message was dispatched to Colonel Coles CMS, DSO (OC 5th Bn) informing him of General Riddell's death and that as the senior officer in the Bde, command had now devolved to him. However, the location of Colonel Coles HQ was unknown at the time, so it was not until 7pm that he arrived at Brigade HQ.
At 7.30pm Col Coles, having ascertained that the services of the Bde were no longer required in the first line trench, ordered the troops to retire and to bivouac at Wieltje.
A 4th Bn officer wrote: “After the attack it was a strange sight when darkness fell that night. Although quite close to the German trenches both sides seemed to be tired of fighting for the present, and we were able to get up and walk about with comparative safety and get the Battalions and Companies sorted up ready for everybody else. We had a busy time after that gathering in wounded and burying the dead, and there were many things I saw that night I should be glad to forget. What disgusted me most I think was the way they fired on the wounded crawling back to shelter. There was a farm about half way up used as a dressing station, and this they shelled continuously and any party of stretcher bearers leaving it always came in for a very hot time”. (Hexham Courant: 29 May 15).
Lt Bunbury was ordered to take a party of men and scour the area immediately to the rear of the trench for dead and wounded. Once the wounded had been taken to the dressing station they had passed in the attack, the party set about burying the dead:
"a most gruesome job, as in many cases we could only ascertain to what battalion the poor dead fellows belonged by examining their identity discs, which in most cases are worn suspended round the neck by a cord next the skin, and many of the corpses were in a fearful state and their clothes stiff with blood.
After a long and laborious time we collected five of our own dead, and I then set the working party to dig two graves for them near the dressing station, while I collected their identity discs and pay books, and went through their packs, haversacks, and pockets, and collected and tied together any little personal belongings which I thought their people might like to have”.
“We put two into each grave and after filling them in we put up a little wooden cross to mark where the first men of the 4th Northumberland Fusiliers who fell in action had been buried on the field of battle. The men we buried were Lance Cpl Woodman, of my platoon (who was subsequently mentioned in dispatches for the gallant work yesterday), Privates Herdman, Paxton and Scott” .
The Bde withdrawal began at 7.30pm and all were 'relieved' and on their way back to 2nd line dugouts around Wieltje by 11pm. So ended the first encounter with the enemy.
The first Bn roll call revealed that 19 men had been killed, 188 wounded and 98 were still missing. Capt's Chipper, Hunting and Plummer, Lts Carrick, Speke and 2nd Lt Allen were all wounded ('D' Coy losing three of its six officers). It was impossible to conduct a proper roll call for several days, because the platoons and companies had all become muddled up and many of the men who had become separated during the attack did not report in until several days later.
More than 50 fusiliers from the 4th Bn were actually killed or died of wounds received on that day.
In all, the Northumbrian Bde had lost forty-two officers and 1912 men, two thirds of its strength in one afternoon.
For the Northumberland Bde, the day passed practically without incident although enemy shelling did cause further losses in the 4th Bn. The Ypres Salient was now much smaller, more dangerous and subject to German artillery shelling from the south, east and north. Colonel G.P.T.Fielding, previously of the Coldstream Guards, arrived at 5pm and assumed command of the Bde.
L/Cpl John Ord was out searching for snipers who were firing on the stretcher-bearers:
“it was the most awful time of my life. They asked for volunteers and I went, as they could not get our wounded in. One of the wounded lads lay on the field all night, and when he was trying to get a drink from his water bottle the sniper shot him in the back. I helped to carry him in and we were shelled all the way, but we were fortunate in never being hit”. (Hexham Courant: 15 May 1915)
The 4th Bn remained in the Wieltje dugouts for the rest of the week, unable to venture out during daylight due to the continual artillery fire and for fear of snipers. This left them little to do other than improve the dugouts in which they were resting. It was however, an opportunity for the men to write home and attempt to describe the actions of the past few days to family and friends. During the first few weeks in Flanders many of these letters were published by the Hexham Courant and Herald newspapers. Censoring them prior to dispatch became a daily and time-consuming chore for platoon commanders.
Once darkness fell, the Bn began what was to become a routine for the rest of the war. A routine common to all infantry Bns held in support or reserve, that of providing parties of men to work under the supervision of the Divisional RE Coys. Typically these working parties were tasked with carrying raw materials from the supply dumps, digging and repairing trenches and erecting barbed wire entanglements. Many of these nocturnal outings involved hazardous treks over considerable distances, such as the one on the night of the 27th, recalled by Lt Bunbury:
"we went out again on a working expedition, and this time we went by a circuitous cross country route, so as to avoid the Germans favourite spots for dropping shells, to Hill 60, which was at this time in our possession. Got back to our dugouts about 2.30am, having had a pleasant little cross-country walk of about 8 or 10 miles”.
Letter from a 4th battalion officer published in the Hexham Courant newspaper on the 15th of May 1915.
“At last we are back from the firing line, where the air is sweeter and one does not need to be continually dodging ‘coal boxes’ shrapnel etc. We are having a rest now after our strenuous ten days right amongst it – in the thick of the biggest artillery fight which has taken place for some time. It is a pleasure to be out of the continuous din of bursting shells and the stink of fumes and dead. Just before we came away last night there was another attack, and those poisonous gases were used by the enemy. (We had respirators over our mouths). I thought the enemy had got through, but some heroes in front of us stuck in and held them back”.
“We were addressed this morning by Field Marshall Sir John French, and he stuck it in very thick, said we had done magnificently all the ten days we were under fire etc etc, and thanked us, and in fact said we were no ‘small beer’. So we are bucked up some. Well we are having good sleeps now and reorganising, as we had practically no sleep when we were in the trenches, could only move about under cover of the darkness, as there was always plenty of Taubes flying about watching for us. We feel a little foot sore, not being able to have our boots off practically since we left Blyth, otherwise very fit. It is very pretty countryside here, thickly dotted with little whitewashed thatched farmhouses, and every inch of ground is cultivated. Everything seems much farther out than at this time at home. Quite a change to the desolation of where we were in the fighting line”.
Due to heavy shelling and continual overflights by German spotter planes most of the Bn remained in their dugouts throughout the day. There was some excitement, when a German aeroplane flying over the allied lines was hit by anti aircraft fire:
"It came down quite low over the Bns dugouts, whereupon all our troops anywhere near opened rapid rifle fire on it, with the result that it fell abruptly quite a short distance in front of where we were”.
At 5.45pm the Northumberland Bde was ordered to provide working parties to dig a line south of the Ypres-Zonnebeke road and astride the Menin Road. At 6pm the 4th and 6th Bns were ordered to provide the first relief for these parties. However, most of the 4th Bn were employed digging trenches at Bellewarde Farm between 8pm and 3am while Lt Bunbury was left with a small party of men to clean up the lines and look after the dug outs until their return.
Records show that at least 50 fusiliers from the 4th Bn were killed in action or died of wounds during the Battle of St Julien. For information on 4th Bn burial and memorial sites for casualties sustained in this battle, select the link.
1st Canadian Division - Consisted of 1st, 2nd and 3rd Canadian Bdes.
The 1st Bde comprised the 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th Bns.
The 2nd Bde comprised 5th, 7th, 8th and 10th Bns.
The 3rd Bde comprised 13th, 14th, 15th and 16th Bns.
45th (Algerian) Division - French Army Division.
Geddes Detachment - Named after Colonel A.D Geddes and comprised of four Bns from the 28th Divn. 2nd Bn - Buffs, 3rd Bn - Middlesex, 5th Bn - Kings Own and 1st Bn - York and Lancaster.
Northumbrian (Territorial) Division - Comprised of the Northumberland, York & Durham and Durham Light Infantry Brigades.
The Northumberland Bde - Comprised of the 4th, 5th, 6th and 7th Bn - Northumberland Fusiliers.
The York and Durham Bde - Comprised 4th Bn - East Yorkshires, 4th and 5th Bn - Green Howards and 5th Bn - Durham Light Infantry.
The Durham Light Infantry (DLI) Bde - Comprised the 6th, 7th, 8th and 9th Bns DLI. Select link to find out more about this Division.
Other units of the Northumbrian Divn
1st Northumberland Field Ambulance - One of three Territorial Field Ambulance units in the 50th (Northumbrian) Division. Staffed by 10 officers and 224 men from the Royal Army Medical Corps (RAMC) personnel.
No2 Field Company RE - Territorial unit of the Royal Engineers (RE). There were two RE Field Companies and a Signals Company in the Northumbrian Division.
No2 Coy ASC Train - No2 Company of the Army Service Corps (ASC) Train. The 'train' was the transport, comprising horses, carts, wagons and bicycles. Four companies in a Division. A company assigned to each Brigade and one to Headquarters.
Bellewarde - Village east of Ypres.
Bellewarde Farm - East of Ypres.
Brandhoek - Village 8km west of Ypres (Ieper).
Farm Vanheule - Near village of St Julien.
Fortuin - Village north-east of Ypres.
Kitcheners Wood - West of the village of St Julien.
Langemarck - Village to the north east of Ypres.
Locality 'C' -
Oudezeele - Village 4km north of Cassel.
Oxford Road Junction -
Potijze - Village to the north east of Ypres.
Steenvoorde - 7km east of Cassel.
St Julien - Village to the north east of Ypres, now referred to as St Juliaan. Captured by the Germans - 24th April 1915
Vanheule Farm - Farm buildings to the right of the Ypres to St Julien road, north east of Wieltje.
Wieltje - Village to the north east of Ypres.
Ypres - Medieval Flemish town around which the salient formed in 1914. Known as Ieper in the Flemish language.
Yser Canal - Canal running north north-west from Ypres10.
Pont de Briques - Approximately 3km inland from the port of Boulogne.
Northumbrian Bde War Diary, 4th Bn War Diary,