Monday,
27th May 1918
At 1am the
enemy put down an extraordinarily intense barrage
consisting of high explosive and gas along the
whole of the forward area. All the troops were
'stood to' at their battle positions, but this
resulted in many casualties on account of the
shelling.
 'the
whole front from Soissons to Reims broke into
flame, and we knew that for the third time in
ten weeks we were up against the real thing.
Within fifteen minutes it was obvious that the
Hun had an extraordinary concentration of guns
of every calibre, and that his bombardment had
been organised beforehand in most thorough and
accurate fashion. A big proportion of gas was
used, about four varieties being distinguished
in the later French and British reports. The
whole line was deluged with shells, and the front
trenches especially must have been reduced to
a pulverised mass. (Callin.1919:57)
At 3.45am an
attack developed along the entire line with the
enemy advancing towards the 4th Bn positions from
behind the Ouvrage De La Carriere, in
a south easterly direction running almost parallel
with Route 44. Fusiliers
from the two Coys manning the outposts, who survived
the bombardment, withdrew to the line of posts
that constituted the real front line on the reverse
slope, where Lewis gun and rifle fire broke up
the attack and drove the enemy back.
The
attack was soon renewed, because at 4am German
infantry reformed behind four tanks and broke through
the line of posts on the right flank of the Bn,
near Butte de Margrave,
and advanced towards the Battle
line held by "D" Coy
and two Coys from the 6th Bn. The German advance
was so rapid, the forward Coy on the left flank
withdrew to discover that the enemy was already
behind them in Butte de Siegfried.
The Bn War Diary records that very few men from
this Coy were seen again.
At 4.15am the
'Battle line' came into action. By this time virtually
all the allied artillery had been silenced and
was no longer effective in assisting the infantry.
Brave resistance was offered on the Battle Line,
but by 4.45am the enemy tanks
turned and overwhelmed the right flank of the line
near Ville Au Bois and
positions held by the 23rd Bde,
resulting in the loss of the trenches and the two
Coys from the 6th Bn who were in them.
 Behind
them, in the Battle Zone, lay four small French redoubts,
including Centre Marceau,
occupied by 4th and 6th Bn HQs and the two remaining
coys from the 6th Bn. The remnants of ‘D’ Coy
(Capt Allen)
and Bn HQ (Lt Col B.D
Gibson), about forty men in all, withdrew to Centre
Marceau. From here a telephone link was established
with Bde HQ
at Centre de Evreux. In the last message transmitted
at 5am, Lt Col Gibson informed
the Brigadier that he was holding out with his
HQ and about forty men.
By 5.30am the
line of redoubts had been outflanked from the right
and the Centre Marceau was attacked in force from
the right, the front and the rear. They held out
for sometime, but the survivors finally withdrew
to the Butte De L’Edmond,
a post where all four machine guns had been knocked
out by the bombardment. They joined a party from
the Divisional MG Bn
and made a further stand, but Lt
Col Gibson was killed by a shot through the
head, while organising the last defences.
‘Thus
the Battalion lost its Commanding Officer – a
man revered and loved by all. All nerve and will,
he died fighting to the last, the very incarnation
of courage. A born leader and a superb soldier,
he had joined in the early Volunteer days, finally
becoming Commanding Officer in the summer of
1915. His name will be ever remembered by those
who knew him as one of the straightest, strongest
men we have known’. (Callin.1919:57)
At 5.15am Brigadier
General Riddell ordered the 5th Bn (held in reserve
at Pontavert in
the Aisne valley), to send two Coys forward to
reinforce the Battle Zone. The message did not
arrive until 6.10am, by which
time one of the redoubts and the Butte de L'Edmond
were already in enemy hands, so inevitably the
fusiliers were subjected to heavy fire and unable
to make headway. The other redoubts held out much
longer; but finally all were surrounded and captured.
From this time the 4th and 6th Bns ceased to exist
as fighting units.
 A
few fusiliers were able to escape and joined others
from the 149th Bde retreating along the canal bank
from Pontavert, towards Concevreux. The 4th Bn
administrative and transport coys were in Conceveux,
along with Major Robb (Bn 2 i/c),
Capt Turner and Lt Goodbody.
Around 8.30am, Majors H.W Jackson
(Bde Major) and Ridley Robb (4th Bn) organised
a hasty defence.
Major
H.W Jackson, in a letter sent to General Riddell
after the war, relates the last ditched attempt
to guard the bridges over the Aisne- the details
providing a very evocative picture of an army in
retreat:
'Well, you
will remember the perfect stream of men coming
along the canal bank from the direction of Pontavert.
I stopped these men at the bridge- there were
no more than 2% of NCO's and
no officers. I suppose I collected some 200 in
due course- formed them up in two ranks and told
them off into sections and platoons on the canal
bank. There were men of the 8th Division, 149th
and 151st Brigades and other details. I explained
the situation to all the men as best I could,
formed four composite platoons and placed them
in position.
Major Robb
(4th N. F.) came
up about that time. I handed over to him and
said I would go along to the left, find out what
was happening, find Major Tweedy (Commander ?th
NF.) and establish a brigade headquarters in
Concevreux. Just as I was going off, a major
of the Worcesters came along the canal bank in
a car! Apparently a battalion of the Worcesters-25th
Division- was coming up to help us. We discussed
the situation to the accompaniment of a few 'pings'
from a Boche sniper's rifle. I said I thought
2 companies should counter-attack along the southern
bank of the canal with the blowing up of Pontavert
bridge (about 1200 yards away) as their objective,
as I was convinced that only a few Boche had
crossed the canal up to that time, but it was
certain that the 8th Division-(who I think were
responsible)- had failed to blow up the bridge.
Also touch had to be gained with the 8th Division.
The Worcesters did eventually go up to our right
flank but were too late to achieve anything in
the form of a counter-attack.'
From
the 4th Bn diary it appears that Major Robb and
Capt Turner gathered together every available man
and set off down the canal bank to form a defensive
position at the canal bridge south of Chaudardes until
such time as the Royal Engineers were able to blow
it up. However, around 9am the
enemy had succeeded in crossing the Aisne by the
bridges in Pontavert and were advancing down both
sides of the canal. With the enemy also spotted
on the high ground to the north west, around 10am Major
Robbs' party withdrew across the Aisne. They were
joined later by Lt Goodbody and managed to hold
the position from 9am until 3.30pm,
at which time orders were received to withdraw
to the high ground above Concevreux.
Details
and the remainder of the Bde were then organised
on a line running from Concevreux Bridge, along
the canal Bank, to the wood to the north-west.
But again it was but a temporary line from which
the enemy drove them out of around 4pm.
 A
few of us remained in Concevreux during the morning
to deal with what wounded we could. Fifty or
sixty perhaps passed through our hands and were
sent on to hospital at Meurival – on stretchers,
on doors, and on barrows. Nicholson (who had
been acting as Liason Officer with Brigade) came
in with a very nasty wound in the thigh, but
as cheery and as indomitable as ever. The last
we dressed was our Regimental Sergeant Major,
Fewster, very badly hit indeed. What happened
to poor Fewster after he left us we do not know. (Callin.1919:57)
The
remnants of the Bn withdrew to the eastern edge
of Concevreux around 1pm in order
to align with the position held by the 3rd
Bn Worcestershire Regt, who
had been unable to advance through the woods towards
Roucy.
Despite
the enemys' use of hand grenades during several
attempts to work down the canal bank they were
beaten back. However, with the enemy now in the
woods south-east of Concevreux and on the Concevreux-Meurival
road the Bde Major issued orders for a fighting
withdrawal to the high ground south of Concevreux.
Here the surviving fusiliers were regrouped and
placed under the command of officers from their
own Bn.
At 4pm this
reorganised force took up position in a prepared
defensive line running across the Concevreux-Ventelay
road (just north of point 200, where the track
crosses the road) (map ref: Soisssons 22 1/100,000)
with the 3rd Bn Worcs Regt in contact on the right
flank and the Lancashire Fusiliers on
the left. This position was held against repeated
attacks, but around 9.30pm the
3rd Bn Worcesters were outflanked on the right
and forced to withdraw, although they had managed
to inflict many casualties on the enemy. The 4th
Bn withdrew and occupied a new line south of Le
Faite Farm. The enemy was then observed in the
northern outskirts of Ventelay, so a further cross-country
withdrawal had to be made on a compass bearing
through woods and fields. A new defensive position
was established south of Ventelay, straddling the
Romain-Ventelay and Montigny-Ventelay roads.
'What happened
during the rest of that day and the next must
be told in snatches. The long string of Transport,
making its slow way down the zig zag road to
Ventelay and Romaine, was hit with deadly accuracy,
and we lost both men and animals. It was a nerve
racking time for Pickering, but his coolness
and wise leadership never showed to better advantage.
They were gassed, shelled, fired at repeatedly
by machine guns from aeroplanes, and bombed by
the roadside. One thing which imperilled the
survivors and the Transport was that the Bosche
had been able to execute a tremendous flanking
movement on the left, and had come round with
incredible rapidity. Perhaps the most pathetic
thing about it all was that several hospitals
in this way fell into his hands before the wounded
had all been removed. Many of those we had treated
at the Aid Post at Concevreux had to be reported ‘’ Missing’’
as the result of this'. (Callin:
1939) |
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