Monday,
26th April 1915
General
Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien issued Operation Order
No8 at 2.15am. The French were
to launch an attack with their right flank on the
Ypres- Langemarck road.
“At the same time
the Lahore Division and
troops under General Aldersons’ command, were
to recapture much of the ground recently lost. The
Lahore Divn was to advance through V Corps positions
to attack in the direction of Langemarck, on a thousand-yard
front. At the time they were bivouacking near Outerdom,
some ten kilometres to the south west of Ypres. They
had already marched thirty miles from Bethune to
get there and, undisturbed by the clamour of the
distant bombardment, most of them were sleeping like
logs. By 5.30am they were back on
the road, setting off at half-hour intervals to march
through Ypres to take up positions north of the St
Jean-Wieltje road in preparation for the attack”. (Macdonald:
p.251).
‘A’
Coy awoke to find a thick mist covering the ground.
As soon as they had eaten, they set off across
country to rejoin the rest of the Bn, whose positions
near Wieltje were now known. The rest of the Bde
was also concentrated around Wieltje, under the
orders of the 1st Canadian Divn and ready to act
as reserve in the forthcoming attack. Lt Bunbury
was in hope that the Bn would be moved further
back from the front line, but they soon discovered
that they were destined to move forward again.
That morning the 4th Bn was placed in good trenches
a little to the east of Wieltje and subjected to
a heavy artillery bombardment as German spotter
planes flew overhead unhindered.
At 10.15am Brigadier
General J.F.Riddell (GOC
Northumberland Bde) received orders from the GOC
10th Bde to verify a 28th Divn report that stated
the enemy was breaking through the front line near
Fortuin. At 10.45am the 5th Bn was
directed to send forward an officers patrol to verify
the report and to move the Bn forward to Fortuin
in preparation for a counterattack if the enemy was
discovered breaking through. By 12 noon OC
5th Bn was satisfied that the enemy was not attempting
to break through at the place indicated. The Bn was
subject to heavy shell fire, so they dug in and remained
there until dusk, consequently taken no part in the
operations of the afternoon.
At 12.15pm General
Alderson issued Operation Order No 12, instructing
a Bn from the 10th Bde to advance alongside the Lahore
Division, between Kitcheners Wood and the Wieltje-St
Julien road. At the same time, the Northumberland
Bde was to attack St Julien astride the Wieltje-St
Julien road. When the artillery barrage commenced
at 1.20pm, the Bns detailed for
the attack were to advance to the positions from
which it would be launched at 2.05pm.
It
was not until 1.30pm that Brigadier-General
Riddell received these orders, so he had to summon
the 4th, 6th and 7th battalion commanders immediately.
He stated, that in the opinion of the Commander-in-Chief,
it was imperative for the Germans to be kept out
of Ypres and that the only way to do this was to
fling more men into the breach, make rapid attacks
and counter-attacks and to give the enemy the impression
that there were large reserves to call upon. Lt
Col Foster was
instructed to advance an attack with the 4th Bn in
a north-easterly direction with their left flank
on the Wieltje-St Julien road. The 6th Bn were to
advance with their right flank on the road and the
7th Bn were detailed to provide support for the 4th
Bn. The fusiliers of the 4th Bn were just finishing
their lunch when Colonel Foster returned with the
orders, but by 1.50pm they were
all on the move. Lt Col Foster called for his four
company commanders and issued orders for the battalion
to advance in lines of platoons at fifty yard intervals.
Two companies, under the command of Major Stephenson,
were to be in the first line and two in the rear
under the command of the colonel himself.
According
to Lt Bunbury
no further information or detail was provided, so
when the attack began few if anyone in the Bn had
any idea where the allied front line trenches were
in this part of the line, or what the objective of
the attack was. The report submitted by Bde HQ after
the action highlights the difficulties:
“The distance from
Wieltje to St Julien was approximately 13/4 miles
and the ground had not been previously reconnoitred
by the staff or any of the officers of the Brigade.
No information was received or could be obtained
as to the actual position of either our own or the
enemy's trenches nor was it known that the GHQ line
was strongly wired and that there were only certain
places through which the troops would be able to
pass.
No communication was ever
made with the artillery and no artillery officers
got in any way into touch with the Brigadier. The
time was short, the order to attack being received
at 1.30pm, nevertheless considering
that any failure to attack on the part of the Brigade
might seriously hamper the operations General Riddell
decided to carry out the orders he had received impossible
as they seemed”. 
The
4th and 6th Bns reached the GHQ line (map ref: C22b
& C23c) and were deployed either side of the Wieltje-St
Julien road by 2.05pm, immediately
coming under heavy shell, machine gun and rifle fire.
The thick wire entanglements in front of the GHQ line
caused delay and heavy losses, as the men bunched together
to squeeze through the gaps. Nevertheless, the wire
was negotiated and the advance towards St Julien commenced.
Lt
Bunbury wrote:
“We lost no time
in getting away, and as soon as we passed through
the barbed wire entanglements in front of our trenches,
we set off in lines of platoons at about forty yards'
interval. Plummer, Turner,
and Varvill went
with our first line two platoons, and Frank Robinson
and myself followed with the other two (Nos 1 and
2).
Practically from the moment
we started off we had to face a perfectly hellish
shelling, which increased in intensity as we advanced.
Shells of every description literally raining on
us from our front, right flank and rear, while it
seemed to me in the excitement of the advance that
our artillery were giving us no support whatever.
 The
line of our advance lay for about a mile over open
ground, and after we had gone a short way, in addition
to the inferno of shells in which we were, we became
exposed to a very heavy rifle and machine gun fire
from the German trenches, which were directly in
front of us near a wood at the top of some rising
ground, and in such a position that they could fire
right over what turned out to be our advanced trench,
down on to us. The small arm fire was intense, and
the nearest thing I can liken it to is a gigantic
swarm of angry bees buzzing all around one. Men were
falling on every side, and I felt an intense excitement,
but there was no time for thinking, and my one idea
was to push on as fast as possible, and to get as
many men as possible to follow me, and keep going”.
Under circumstances such
as these, Companies and Battalions soon get mixed
up, and the last point at which I knew I had the
major part of my own men still with me was after
I had gone about half way, when we had to cross the
St Julien road, and here we lay down for a breather.
“Frank Robinson was
the only one of our officers I remember being there,
and we appeared to have about a hundred men still
with us, though the various lines were already getting
mixed, and a good number of them were not belonging
to our Company. From here we could see a trench some
hundreds of yards in front of us, which with the
scanty instructions we had received might have proved
to be a German one, but I am thankful to say that
I gave orders not to fire, as it turned out to be
our own advanced trench occupied by the Seaforths.
One could scarcely hear one's own voice for the awful
din, and it was only by shouting at the top of of
one's voice from mouth to mouth that an order could
be conveyed any distance, This was not a very healthy
place to stay in, and we did not remain there many
minutes, and when FR and
I got up to lead forward again the men, who were
perfectly splendid throughout, rose and followed
us like one man, the order to advance being scarcely
needed. From this point on we were in full view of
the German position, and men were falling thicker
than ever, but we kept plugging along as fast as
we could with our heavy packs, etc., and the perspiration
was fairly pouring off me, as though I was in bad
training, instead of being hard as nails. After we
had gone a short way, I fancied that we were being
shot at from a farm which was about two hundred yards
to our right, and was in the act of swinging some
men round to attack this when some RAMC men
appeared in the door of the building, and signalling
frantically to us not to fire, waved us on in our
original direction, which we then resumed. When still
about 200 yards behind our advanced trench, we came
to a ditch and bank running across our line of advance,
and I had a second breather of a few minutes here,
and, while peeping over the parapet to choose the
line for our further advance, something struck the
parapet, sending a quantity of dirt in my face, and
simultaneously I felt something hot touch my cheek,
and for a moment thought that I had been hit. I turned
to a man behind me, and asked him if I was hit, but
he told me that it was only a graze, and that there
was only a tiny trickle of blood. It was a narrow
shave, but left no more mark than a small razor cut
would. I then went on again, but by this time I only
had a hazy recollection of seeing Frank Robinson
somewhere near me still, as we were approaching the
trench. Just about this time I had another close
shave, as a 'Jack Johnson' burst,
as it seemed, just over my head, and the concussion
threw me face downwards on to the ground, while when
I looked round, previous to rising to go on again,
there was a huge hole just behind me, and several
of the men following me were lying wounded on either
side, while where it had actually fallen there was
no trace of a soul and I fear that three or four
of the poor fellows were blown into little bits r
pounded into the ground. I eventually landed up at
our trench, practically I believe at the same time
as Frank Robinson, and accompanied by but a few men,
several of whom were not even of our Battalion” (Bunbury:
p...).
Meanwhile
Lt Col Foster had stopped for a breather when several
of his men, lying in a shallow ditch behind a hedge,
had beckoned him.
“I was very glad
to do so for we needed the rest, but the few minutes
I could give them seemed to pass in a moment’s
flash, and at the word of command; “Now, lads,
we have some way to go yet, - we must get on’.”
They jumped up on the instant and followed me.
Looking back as I lay upon
the ground after one of our rushes, I saw men being
blown twenty feet into the air by the bursting shells
and, realising that as there was no cover the quicker
we advanced the less we should suffer, I sprang up
and ran ahead, shouting to the men to come on as
fast as possible”
(Foster: p.20).
By 2.45pm the
remnants of the 4th and 6th Bns had reached the front
line trenches (map ref: C17b) and the 7th Bn had
joined the attack. Around 3.10pm isolated
parties of the 6th Bn pushed forward a further 250
yards to occupy trenches from which the enemy had
apparently retired. Elements of the Bn actually succeeded
in entering, and for a time occupying the southern
portion of St Julien, but they were eventually driven
back, mainly due to the effects of gas, and finally
occupied a line a short distance to the south.
During
the whole of this period the Lahore Divn and the
Bn from the 10th Bde were not seen. It was subsequently
discovered that their orders had been cancelled and
the Northumberland Bde had not been informed.
The
4th Bn fusiliers who were lucky enough to reach the
advanced trenches unscathed were surprised to find
they were occupied by a few Seaforth Highlanders
(2nd Bn, 10th Bde). To Colonel Fosters' distress,
he discovered that eight of the highlanders had been
wounded by his men during the advance. Hardly surprising
because the Colonel had not been informed that there
were still British units in his line of attack. A
steady trickle of fusiliers were reaching the trench
and it was soon full, so some men had to dig in to
the rear of it.
Crawling
along the shallow trench Lt Col Foster was pleased
to find Col Jackson and Major Joicey of the 7th Battalion,
and Lts Bunbury and Cranage of the 4th had survived.
Right at the very end of the trench he found Capt
Dixon and Lt Gibson.
At 3.45pm,
Brig Gen Riddell left Bde HQ in the support trench
(map ref: C23a) and went forward, accompanied by
his Bde Major,
to confer with his Bn Cdrs. At a point about one
hundred and fifty yards south of Vanheule Farm (map
ref: C17d) he was shot in the head and died instantly.
As the senior officer in the front line, Lt Col Foster
(OC 4th Bn) assumed command of the Bde and ordered
all three Bns to dig in where they were as best they
could. A message was dispatched to Colonel Coles CMS, DSO (OC
5th Bn) informing him of General Riddell's death
and that as the senior officer in the Bde, command
had now devolved to him. However, the location of
Colonel Coles HQ was unknown at the time, so it was
not until 7pm that he arrived at
Brigade HQ.
At 7.30pm Col
Coles, having ascertained that the services of the
Bde were no longer required in the first line trench,
ordered the troops to retire and to bivouac at Wieltje.
A
4th Bn officer wrote: “After the
attack it was a strange sight when darkness fell
that night. Although quite close to the German trenches
both sides seemed to be tired of fighting for the
present, and we were able to get up and walk about
with comparative safety and get the Battalions and
Companies sorted up ready for everybody else. We
had a busy time after that gathering in wounded and
burying the dead, and there were many things I saw
that night I should be glad to forget. What disgusted
me most I think was the way they fired on the wounded
crawling back to shelter. There was a farm about
half way up used as a dressing station, and this
they shelled continuously and any party of stretcher
bearers leaving it always came in for a very hot
time”. (Hexham
Courant: 29 May 15).
Lt
Bunbury was ordered to take a party of men and scour
the area immediately to the rear of the trench for
dead and wounded. Once the wounded had been taken
to the dressing station they had passed in the attack,
the party set about burying the dead:
"a most gruesome job,
as in many cases we could only ascertain to what
battalion the poor dead fellows belonged by examining
their identity discs, which in most cases are worn
suspended round the neck by a cord next the skin,
and many of the corpses were in a fearful state and
their clothes stiff with blood.
After a long and laborious
time we collected five of our own dead, and I then
set the working party to dig two graves for them
near the dressing station, while I collected their
identity discs and pay books, and went through their
packs, haversacks, and pockets, and collected and
tied together any little personal belongings which
I thought their people might like to have”.
“We put two into
each grave and after filling them in we put up a
little wooden cross to mark where the first men of  the
4th Northumberland Fusiliers who fell in action had
been buried on the field of battle. The men we buried
were Lance Cpl Woodman,
of my platoon (who was subsequently mentioned in
dispatches for the gallant work yesterday), Privates
Herdman, Paxton and Scott” .
The
Bde withdrawal began at 7.30pm and
all were 'relieved' and on their way back to 2nd
line dugouts around Wieltje by 11pm.
So ended the first encounter with the enemy.
The
first Bn roll call revealed that 19 men had been
killed, 188 wounded and 98 were still missing. Capt's
Chipper, Hunting and Plummer, Lts Carrick, Speke
and 2nd Lt Allen
were all wounded ('D' Coy losing three of its six
officers). It was impossible to conduct a proper
roll call for several days, because the platoons
and companies had all become muddled up and many
of the men who had become separated during the attack
did not report in until several days later.
More
than 50 fusiliers from the 4th Bn were actually killed
or died of wounds received on that day.
In
all, the Northumbrian Bde had lost forty-two officers
and 1912 men, two thirds of its strength in one afternoon.
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